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Abstract 
The formation of the Eurasian Economic Union has given rise to an abundance 
of opinions regarding various aspects of organization of this new interstate 
association. The question of the organizational structure of the Eurasian Union, and 
the basic principles underlying its construction is among the discussed ones. The 
paper analyzes the concept of "supranational organization". In particular, the different 
doctrinal approaches to the study of supranational international organizations are 
given, their basic features are formulated, including reference to legal independence 
within the framework of its competence and uncontrollability by Member States; the 
right to make regulations mandatory for execution by Member States; operation of 
interstate union officials in their personal capacity and not as representatives of 
Member States; decisions by a majority vote in proportional (weighted) voting; 
possibility to appeal acts of a supranational authority only in court. 
The authors also address the problem of application of the supranational 
principle elements in the construction of the European Union and the EEU 
administration system. 
The use of such methods of investigation as a comparative legal, systematic and 
structural, formal and legal, allowed the author to conclude about the absence of 
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supranational features to the full extent in the EEU bodies and to identify concerns of 
countries for the loss of their sovereignty as the main reason for this decision. 
Keywords: supranational organization, EEU, principles, authorities. 
  
Introduction 
Institutional system of any interstate association is based on the principles 
which have been recorded in the founding documents. The Eurasian Economic Union 
is no exception. Its organizational structure is based on the general principles which 
are universal and applicable to all activities of the Union. They are codified in the 
Article 3 of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union as of 2014 (EEU) in the 
following terms: respect for the universally recognized principles of international law, 
including the principles of sovereign equality of Member States and their territorial 
integrity; respect for differences of political structure of the Member States; mutually 
beneficial cooperation; equality and taking into account the national interests of the 
Parties; adherence to the principles of market economy and fair competition; 
functioning of the Customs Union without exceptions and restrictions after the end of 
the transitional period [1]. 
The activities of such a powerful inter-state association as the European Union 
is founded on the principles reflected in the founding documents, as well as set out in 
the reasoning of the General Court of the European Union decisions. Among these 
principles are: legality, subsidiarity, proportionality, transparency, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, equality, environmental focus, collaboration [2, 
p.224-324]. 
As you can see, a supranational principle is not formulated and is not formally 
codified in those basic principles of interstate associations. However, the terms "a 
supranational body," "supranational law" are widely used in legal doctrine. For 
example, the EU Court of Justice, the EU Commission, EU Parliament, the Court of 
Auditors are called as the supranational institutions (bodies) in the European Union. 
Even at the dawn of the European Communities supranational institutional 
mechanism has been established (Treaty of Paris in 1951) which "continues to be in 
force to this day, but as a mechanism of political power throughout the European 
Union" [2, p.84]. It should be noted that "any international treaties, judicial decisions, 
as well as in any other sources of law does not give a definition of this concept" [3, 
p.71]. 
In this context, the purpose of the work is determined by the need to identify 
the content of the supranationality principle and its features in the formation of 
interstate associations. This goal is achieved through the analysis of the legislation of 
relevant intergovernmental organizations. 
Methods  
The method of comparative legal analysis of the European Union and the EEU 
institutional structure allowed revealing a supranational basis in structure of the key 
bodies of the intergovernmental organizations and highlighting their features. 
The use of structured system method of obtaining knowledge has allowed 
identifying the main features of supranational international organizations. 
Formal legal research method was used in determining the content of concepts 
such as "supra-national", "supranational organizations", "international 
communication", and others. 
Discussions 
Supranationality as a principle of organization and activity in its various aspects 
is actively developed in the doctrine of international law. Such constructions as 
"supra-national organization", "supranational law", and "supranational authority", 
used to refer to entities vested with powers specific to the goals and objectives of 
international organizations, and interstate associations are subjected to analysis. It has 
been suggested that the term "supranationality" can be used to characterize an 
international organization as a whole, but not for the law of the organization. It is 
emphasized that the "supranational law by its nature is none other than a part of the 
international legal system that is just not able at this stage to develop to a certain level 
of statutory self-regulation" [4, p.21]. 
In this regard, we offer to stay on the notion of a "supranational organization." 
M. Bedjaoui considers that supranational organizations have the power over the 
states, and their goal is creation of supranational legal standards (and sometimes even 
against the will of states) which should be applicable in the relations between all the 
actors in the territories of the Member States of the organization. The author believes 
that supranational sovereignty is transferred to international organizations [5, p.71]. 
According to P. Pescatore, a supra-national organization should be regarded as 
"an organization that was created in order to respond to the common needs of several 
states, consists of community institutions that are endowed with autonomy in 
decision-making, as well as endowed with necessary standard-setting, executive and 
control powers that have an effect on states and private persons" [6, p.171]. 
Also there is another position in science that supranational international 
organizations currently do not exist at all, because they are international, and 
intergovernmental organizations [7, p.47]. Thus, it is believed that the International 
Civil Aviation Organization, the International Telecommunication Union, and the 
Universal Postal Union are supranational organizations, as Member States of those 
organizations do not run the risk to extend away from the rules laid down by those 
organizations despite the fact that their constituent documents have no indications 
about their supranationality [5, p.71]. 
Let's consider that the above points of view do not correspond to reality. In our 
view, L. Malloun asserts right that supranational organizations are a relatively new 
milestone in the development of international law. According to him, "supranational 
organizations are the result of the division of powers between the Member States and 
the organization to which they gave a part of their sovereignty" [8, p.45]. 
Indeed, an international organization would be able to realize its supranational 
properties if its bodies (institutions) will have the right to adopt binding acts in force 
in the territory of all member states. This is understandable, because without granting 
a body of an international organization the appropriate authority, it is difficult to 
achieve the purposes for which the community of nations has been created. According 
to A.S. Feshenko "supranationality is a set of powers that the States give to some 
international body for targeted regulation of their relations, and these powers have 
priority concerning the respective competences of the Member States, including the 
possible adoption of decisions binding to them" [9, p. 170]. 
Transfer of sovereign powers of a state to bodies of an international 
organization is possible and necessary, but the question is what should be the scope of 
those powers and the manner in which they would be implemented. A range of 
transferred competence should not put the state in the "non-returnable" dependence on 
the international organization. Preservation of sovereignty is provided by the 
possibility of revocation of the delegated powers without any conditions. In this 
respect, of the key importance is Article 4 of the Treaty on European Union that states 
the following: "The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the 
Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, 
political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall 
respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the 
State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, 
national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State" [10]. 
On the other hand, there is the problem of realization of decisions made in the 
practice of international relations. Without the enforcement mechanism, it is difficult 
to achieve fulfillment by Member States of the prescriptions of an international 
organization body. 
Development of the "supranationality" concept in all its forms allows finding a 
balance between the interests of States and the need to achieve the goals and 
objectives of an inter-state association. M.M. Biryukov believes that a 
"supranationality is "a set of structural, functional and procedural characteristics of an 
international organization determining the priority of its competence in specific areas 
in relation to the respective competences of the Member States. It seems that at the 
forefront here is a possibility of adoption by an international authority of decisions 
binding for the Member States " [11, p.140]. 
Describing an interstate association body as a supranational, a number of 
features which it should have, must be noted. Firstly, it acts as a legally independent 
entity within its competence and not controlled by the Member States. Secondly, such 
a body is entitled to adopt acts which are binding for Member States even in the event 
of a negative attitude toward them on the part of one or several states. Thirdly, 
officials of intergovernmental associations act in their personal capacity and not as 
representatives of Member States. Fourth, decisions are taken by a majority vote by 
proportional (weighted) voting. Fifth, the acts of the supranational authority can be 
challenged only in court. The criteria are met by supranational EU institutions. 
Although this practice has met strong resistance from some member states, "by the 
end of the 1980s, all supreme courts of the Member States formally agreed with this 
doctrine" [11, p.104]. 
The situation is different with the bodies of the Eurasian Economic Union. 
The treaty establishing the EEU on 29 May 2014 included to a number of 
bodies of the Union the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council (Supreme Council), the 
Eurasian Intergovernmental Council (Intergovernmental Council), the Eurasian 
Economic Commission (EEU Commission), the Court of the Eurasian Economic 
Union (Court of Union). The Commission consists of the Council and the 
Commission Board. Of these, only two bodies could be considered as supranational: 
the Commission Board and the Court of EEU. The rest, the Supreme Council, the 
Intergovernmental Council, the Council of the Commission, shall consist of 
representatives of Member States and are intended to reflect the interests of their 
states. 
The Supreme Council is the authority of political leadership that makes 
decisions aimed at implementing the objectives of the Union. It is composed of the 
heads of the Member States. The Supreme Council considers fundamental questions 
on the Union's activities, determines the strategy, integration development trends and 
prospects (Article 12 of the Treaty). Decisions of the Supreme Eurasian Economic 
Council shall have precedence over the decisions of the Eurasian Intergovernmental 
Council and the Eurasian Economic Commission. 
The Intergovernmental Council is a body of the Union that consists of the heads 
of the Member States' governments. Its meetings are held as necessary, but at least 2 
times a year. An extraordinary session of the Intergovernmental Council may be 
convened on the initiative of any Member State or the Chairman of the 
Intergovernmental Council. 
The Council of the Commission composed of representatives, one from each 
member state who is the deputy head of the government and endowed with the 
necessary powers in accordance with the laws of the state. Thus, the Council of the 
Commission consists of officials who have a certain status in the government of a 
Member State and authorities of the Union do not affect on their appointment. The 
Member States shall only notify each other as well as the Commission Board on their 
representatives in the Council of the Commission. 
Another procedure is used for formation of the Commission Board. It is 
composed of representatives of the Member States on the basis of the principle of 
equal representation of the Member States. The number of members of the 
Commission Board and the distribution of responsibilities among its members is 
determined by the Supreme Council. One of them is the Chairman of the Commission 
Board. 
The members of the Commission Board work in the Commission on a regular 
basis. In exercising their powers, they are independent of government bodies and 
officials of the Member States and can not seek or receive instructions from 
authorities or officials of the Member States. 
Members of the Commission Board are not allowed to combine work in the 
Board with the other work or engage in other paid activities, except for teaching, 
scientific or other creative activities for the entire term of their office. 
Thus, the Commission Board may be considered for eligibility which is 
characteristic for a supranational body. However, on closer acquaintance with the 
powers of the Board and the organization of its work it can be found close 
collaboration between the Commission Board with the Commission Council and other 
bodies of the Union turning on the most important issues into relations of the 
hierarchical subordination. 
Thus, the Board annually reports on its work to the Commission Council, and 
its meetings may be attended by representatives of the Member States. Execution of 
the decision of the Board may be suspended by the Intergovernmental Council, and 
amended or repealed by the Supreme Council. Thus, it is clear that the Commission 
Board does not have full autonomy in the adoption and implementation of its 
decisions, and therefore it can not fully be called a supranational body of the Union. 
The only body corresponding to criteria of a supranational body is the Court of 
the Union. It has rights of a legal entity, keeps its own documentation, has a seal and 
letterheads with its name, establishes its official website and the official bulletin. It 
consists of two judges from each member state. They all have equal rights. Control of 
its activity is executed by the President of the Court which has a deputy. They have 
been elected a seat in the Court by judges from the Court in accordance with the 
Regulations and approved by the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council. 
When taking up their posts, a judges ceases to be a representative of the State 
which nominated him/her for the post. The judges also are not representatives of the 
territories, nations, nationalities, social and religious groups, and individuals. 
After the appointment, a state is not able to demand the release of judges from 
office except for the grounds specified in the Statute of the Court. Therefore, its 
impact on a judge is objectively insignificant. 
Conclusions  
Founders of the Eurasian Economic Union have tried to exclude from the 
organizational structure of the Union the bodies with a pronounced supranational 
character. One can speculate on the reasons for this decision, but the fact remains that 
Member States are commited to neutralize any attempts to attack on their sovereign 
right to influence the content of binding acts of the Union. This approach is based on 
the simple assumption that any supranational body gets powers from sovereign states 
and upon a transfer of the powers to the body the states lose a part of their sovereign 
powers. It is hardly possible to share those fears, since upon transfer of its powers a 
state does not lose its sovereignty and can always get out of the interstate association 
(to terminate membership in an international organization). 
That's exactly right that only states may possess attributes of sovereignty, and 
that an international organization is not independent and has no the political will [13, 
p.1032]. Only a state has the right to decide what amount of authority could be given 
to the bodies of an international organization. The judgment is fair on that only a 
sovereignty creates so-called supranational organizations such as the European Union 
[14, p.38]. The lack of political will of an international organization eliminates the 
unconditional imposition of decision-making by supranational bodies of Member 
States. The very nature of an international organization implies voluntary compliance 
by Member States of a supranational law (its rules) on their territory. Withdrawal 
from an integration association eliminates the need to follow the requirements of the 
Union bodies. Only federalization could lead to the transfer of sovereign rights to 
supranational bodies. 
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